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# Developed Countries of the World the Process of Carrying out Calculations in the US and Japan through Non - Cash Plastic Cards

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**Abstract:** The article discusses a number of opinions on the analysis of the introduction of cashless payments in the United States and Japan.

**Keywords:** banking system, Retail Banking Services, Banking Client, SMS banking, debit card, credit cards, and digital technology.

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The wide use of Cards is one of the characteristics of retail payment systems of consumers in the United States. US consumers will use these cards to pay for a quarter of their retail purchases per year. And this is not a static phenomenon; among other things, the use of debit cards, although it remains relatively small, is growing rapidly. However, this model of use is not typical for other countries. Even in some highly developed countries, consumers are less likely to use cards to pay for purchases. For example, the statistics of the International Bank of accounts offers in the US about 60 card operations per person per year, but in Japan there are only four such operations per person per year. But the differences are simply out of desire. Use cards to make retail payments. The average operation of a card used in Japan is much larger than the average card payment operation in the United States. At the same time, Japanese cardholders are much more likely to pay their bills each month than us cardholders: debts exceeding the first reporting period occur in just one tenth of Japanese credit card operations, while US cardholders borrow about half every month.

The reasons for the differences in the way Cards are used (or not used) have several important political implications. First, their success in countries where cards are often used shows that they usually provide payments cheaper and more efficient than competing retail payment systems. By reducing the transaction costs of retail operations, these systems usually increase the efficiency of the retail sector of the economy. Secondly, at least in the United States, leading scientists associate the credit card with an incredibly high level of consumer banking - usually the highest among all industrialized countries. Thirdly, there are good reasons to believe that the wide use of credit cards is inversely related. Nation saving rate. If, as some scientists have pointed out, the use of credit cards leads to a decrease in savings, then the policy that encourages the use of credit cards after 7 refers to the aspects of macroeconomic planning that affect the rates of savings. Thus, interested politicians should have a deeper understanding of the institutional omillarni that encourages them to use the cards in general or, in particular, use the cards as an object of credit.

At first, it is natural that the model raises the question of whether economic factors dominate, and not social construction factors. For example, in payment cards there may be something particularly attractive for certain types and prospects of consumers. Thinking about it, we can assume that card-based payment systems are more attractive to relatively corrupt and self-reliant consumers in the United States and less attractive to cautious and cautious consumers in countries such as Japan. I think the puddles can explain a lot of the crime risk model. Focusing on this problem, it can be assumed that Americans carry cards because they do not want to carry cash that can be stolen from them; the Japanese have less incentive to carry cards because their relatively unscrupulous society makes it safe to carry large amounts of cash.

In these explanations, of course, there is some truth, but they themselves can not understand the pattern I'm following. In particular, since these factors are mostly static, they can not understand the significant changes in the use of Japanese cards, they tend to make the use of Japanese cards more and more similar to the US patterns. The purpose of this article is to examine the legal and economic institutions that may affect this model.

In this regard, in the first part of the article, an attempt is made to form an institutional omillarni, which may have a general explanatory power in predicting the success of the payment card system. The analysis begins with the fact that any card payment system should work as a network that suffers from economic constraints that make it difficult to create networks, and under the influence of network effects that make it difficult to migrate them once they emerge. This type of network is very difficult to create, because it requires the participation of groups of three, usually individual subjects - financial institutions that issue cards, consumers who use them and sellers who accept them. Of course, given this main problem, it is not at all surprising that many countries do not have a successful credit card industry; it is a little more unusual that such an industry has been successful in place.

Chapter II highlights that four separate institutional considerations are important conditions for the development of card networks:

- Regulatory environment that gives banks the opportunity to freely participate in the credit card market (because Deposit organizations have the best opportunities to develop payment and credit products based on cards).
- A retail environment that includes a significant base of relatively large retailers (for which it is easier for them to have constant costs of accepting credit cards).
- Low communication costs (because low communication costs help to create an effective system against fraud).
- The volume of the National Retail economy (due to the economies of scale in the rapid adoption of technological achievements).

Structurally, the first of these factors affects the delivery of Cards by financial institutions; the second affects the willingness of traders to accept cards; the third and fourth factors usually affect the economic efficiency of the system.

The last two factors are the long-term factors that helptirishga understand the ice age of the card industry in Japan. On the contrary, the first two factors have undergone significant changes in the last decade. Thus, the retail sector of Japan has become very hospitable for credit cards, as there have been new legal regulations on the types of credit cards that auxiliary banks can issue and the emergence of very large retail businesses that are common in the United States.

In my opinion, these factors significantly explain the change in the use of credit cards in

Japan.

In Japan, there is very little room for its success, as the credit card has been modified to fill a product that is very similar to a debit card-filled product in the United States. So, while the Japanese debit card seems to be a more efficient product in some respects than the US debit card - and in general it should be more attractive to Japanese consumers who prefer cash-it is unlikely that it will play an important role. Japanese trade.

### Conclusion

The financial systems developing in one country cannot be transferred to other countries with different institutional conditions without changes. If they are moved, then the roles they play, as in debit and credit cards, will change to take into account the background on which they are placed, as if they were looking for gaps between the plants where the growth of new plants is already close. Omillarni understanding that affects this growth is important not only for businesses that want to develop effective payment systems, but also for policy analysts who want to limit the development of payment systems that can have detrimental consequences for those who use them.

### Literature used

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2. Generally speaking, a debit card is a card that pays for transactions by withdrawing funds from the bank account established during the transaction. In the US market, the functional difference between a debit card and a credit card is that the funds for the debit card operation are automatically withdrawn from the bank account a few days after the transaction, while the credit card is only at the end of the month (if) the cardholder pays the promissory note. For a general introductory discussion of debit cards, see RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 141-46 (1999).
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5. Teresa A. Sullivan, ELIZABETH Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrake, fragile middle class: Americans in debt ch. 4 (2000) (a detailed study and analysis of the relationship between credit card industry and consumer banking in the United States). This view is also supported by the analysis of government experts. See also Diane Ellis, the impact of consumer interest rate regulation on the volume of credit cards, payments and personal bankrolling rates, banking trends 98-05 (FDIS, Department of insurance, March 1998).